Abstract
Introduction
Formal verification of reactive and concurrent systems may help to ease and focus the reliable design and testing of systems of increasing complexity. Verification has been approached through theorem proving and state space methods. The formalisms employed in state space methods may be roughly divided into two categories, state-based and actionbased formalisms. State-based methods include model checking of many temporal logics that use Kripke structures and similar models [3, 12] and action-based methods include many process algebraic methods [13, 15] , where Labelled Transition Systems (LTSs) are used as a model. State-based formalisms talk about properties of the global state of the system, whereas action-based formalisms talk about how the components of a system interact. This is why some properties may be harder to express using just one approach.
It is often inconvenient to build a model and write specifications formally, if a unified approach is lacking. In this article, we define a formalism called the labelled state transition system or LSTS, which combines LTSs with atomic state propositions and provides a way to benefit from both state-based and action-based models.
A similar model has been used in [8] , but there the state propositions have an effect on synchronisation, which we explicitly wish to avoid. The fact that propositions do not affect synchronisation makes it possible to use state-based and action-based methods separately. Process algebraic methods can be fully used for describing the components and their interaction and state-propositions preserve the information of the states of the components. This allows us to express and verify safety and liveness properties as presented in the example of Section 6.
We extend to LSTSs the methods used to compositionally construct LTS models to provide a theoretical basis for on-the-fly verification. Some effects of adding state propositions on semantic models of processes, CFFD (chaos free failures divergence) in particular, are also covered briefly. We chose CFFD because it is the weakest congruence that preserves deadlocks and all the properties that can be expressed with next-state free LTL [16] .
For most of what we cover here, LSTSs and their parallel composition have already been implemented in the TVT toolset created by the Verification Algorithm Group [1] at the Institute of Software Systems of Tampere University of Technology in collaboration with Nokia and other funders.
The theoretical background of LSTSs is given in Section 2 and some semantic properties of LSTSs are defined in Section 4. Models can be constructed compositionally using a generalised parallel composition operation, which we define in Section 3. We show how state propositions may be used to express illegal behaviour that can be checked on the fly. The on-the-fly usage of propositional rules is discussed in Section 5. We use a token ring mutual exclusion protocol as an example. We introduce some errors into it, and show how they are detected in Section 6.
LTSs and LSTSs
Various practically equivalent definitions of labelled transition systems may be encountered in the field [17, 15, 2] . To avoid confusion, we explicitly give the one we are using. For convenience, the set ¦ is denoted by ¦ . The following shorthand notation has traditionally been used for sequences of transitions, or executions. Figure 1 presents a simple example of an LSTS. It is a model of a client in a system that we will present in more detail in Section 6. States are usually nameless, but here they are numbered from 1 to 6 for clarity. The initial state × is the state number 1 and it is marked with a small arrow.
Definition 1 (Labelled transition system)
The alphabet ¦ is the set Ö Õ Ö Ö Ð Ý and transitions ¡ is presented with labelled arrows between states.
The propositions ¥ Ï and the values of the function Ú Ð are shown below the state numbers. None of the propositions are permanent and so the set § is empty.
Many state-based verification approaches contain state variables, which may change their values when transitions 6 5 are taken. There may be guards on transitions that define conditions under which they are taken, and post-conditions that allow assigning values to variables. The LSTS formalism is much weaker in this respect. It does not allow modelling of variables or guards with the state propositions. To some extent this is not a restriction. LSTSs with local variables can be compiled into LSTSs in the sense of Definition 2 with an unfolding construction similarly to coloured Petri nets [7] . Indeed, the input language of the TVT tool contains local variables, and TVT contains a compiler from it to LSTSs.
What is more important is that, unlike in [8] , LSTSs cannot test each others' state propositions. This implies that propositions can only be used for verification, for providing information to the designer of the system. Communication between the components of the system takes place via named actions. When shared variables are needed, they may be modelled as LSTSs in their own right. Such modelling is clumsy with traditional parallel composition operators, but not with the operator that we will define in Section 3.
To simplify the presentation of the abstract semantics of LSTSs, we encode the state propositions via an attachment to actions. This will make it possible to generalise certain process-algebraic methods of analysis and reduction from LTSs to LSTSs. In the encoding, the distinction between visible and invisible actions will be replaced by three categories: named actions, unnamed visible actions and invisible actions. We will also have to redefine the ¡ ¡ ¡ and ¡ ¡ ¡ µ notations. Let the notation ¨ denote the sym-
We define the following: 
This notation thus assumes that the action is visible.
The case of ½ È ½ ¡ ¡ ¡ Ò È Ò µ is defined in the same way as for LTSs for both finite and infinite sequences.
Parallel composition
Practically all compositional methods of putting a system together rely on some concept of synchronisation. Making actions invisible or renaming them for synchronisation is achieved using the basic process algebraic operators of hiding, renaming and multiple renaming [15] . The parallel composition operator of this section handles synchronisation of named actions while unnamed actions are considered internal and do not synchronise and proposition are handled separately from actions.
The generalised parallel composition operator uses synchronisation rules to do not only synchronisation, but hiding and (multiple)renaming of actions as well. It is also possible to implement restriction [13] using it. Synchronisation rules are similar to synchronisation vectors in [2] . The marked difference is that a synchronisation rule also contains a label for the resulting transition. For the purposes of this article, the generalised parallel composition is the only type of operator we need. Its LTS version was defined in [10] . 
Definition 3 (Synchronisation rule) Let
In a synchronisation rule, each that is not " " specifies an action of Ä that synchronises to produce the action . If " " it means that Ä does not participate in the execution of .
Synchronisation rules are not affected in any way by the state propositions of the components and vice versa. To talk about how the state propositions behave, we need proposition rules. 
Definition 4 (Proposition rule)
In an LSTS, there may be isolated states that can not be reached from the initial state by any execution. To restrict our investigations to states that are of interest, we define the following:
where:
And by definition, all other components remain the same. 
Definition 6 (Generalised parallel composition) Let
The synchronisation rules define which named actions synchronise and which actions they produce. Synchronisation may result in any action, even invisible. Thus, it implements also hiding and renaming. In fact, it can be shown that this parallel composition can do exactly the same transformations as the traditional parallel composition, hiding and multiple renaming combined, when applied to LTSs [11] .
The values of state propositions are evaluated according to given proposition rules and they have no effect on synchronisation. Furthermore, the values of permanent propositions propagate to the result even in the absence of proposition rules. The same proposition may appear as the result of several rules and be an element of several § . In this case, the disjunction of the values is taken. If there is any disagreement on the kind of proposition between several definitions, persistence wins non-persistence.
The traditional parallel composition can be implemented by choosing © ¦ ½ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¦ Ò and generating synchronisation rules ½ Ò for every action ¾ © by setting if ¾ ¦ and " " otherwise.
CFFD-semantics of LSTSs
To talk about behaviours of systems in an abstract way, we use the concept of semantics. A semantic model induces an equivalence of systems that equates systems that we deem to have the same kind of behaviour. The CFFD semantics model we present is known to be the weakest compositional semantics to preserve all the failures and divergences of a system as well as properties that can be expressed in linear temporal logic without the next-state operator [16] .
The sets of traces (finite and infinite), divergence traces, stable failures, stability of given states and stability of the whole system are properties of given LSTSs. Many different semantic models can be defined using these sets, e.g. CSP [6] , NDFD [9] or CFFD. Let Ä be an LSTS and × ¾ Ë. Then we define the following:
The set of (finite) traces,
The set of infinite traces,
The set of stable failures, 
Definition 7 differs from the CFFD-semantics of LTSs in several respects. First, ¥ and § are added to the "static" part of the semantics. Second, traces now contain information on values of state propositions. If × µ ×, then Ú Ð´×µ can be reconstructed from ¥´Äµ and . In other words, changes of state propositions are visible. This suffices for verifying stuttering-insensitive linear temporal logic properties [12] .
However, state propositions do not affect the refusal sets (the ) in stable failures. Furthermore states that have outgoing -transitions are not considered stable, even if the transitions affect values of propositions. These are because propositions do not affect synchronisation. As a consequence, acceptance-graph-based algorithms such as [14, 18] have less information to process and yield smaller results.
It is also worth mentioning that when dealing with finite LTSs, the set of traces can be deduced from the sets of divergence traces and stable failures and infinite traces are needed only when dealing with infinite LTSs. With LSTSs this is not the case, because an infinite behaviour may occur that leaves no information in either stable failures or divergence traces. For example, in Figure 2 , states are labelled with propositions È and É. The actions after can not be deduced from stable failures and divergence traces alone, since there are no divergence traces and neither of the two rightmost states are stable. To solve this, we have to include the infinite traces. If we wished to restrict ourselves to finite
Figure 2. An example of need for infinite traces
LSTSs, the set of finite traces could be used instead of the set of infinite traces.
In process algebras, it is imperative, that the equivalence defined by the semantic model goes together well with the process-algebraic operators we wish to use, i.e. it should be a congruence. 
If our semantic model is a congruence with respect to the operators we use, we may replace any part of the system with an equivalent one without disturbing the equivalence of the whole system. This is imperative if we analyse our system compositionally, as we will in the example later on.
Theorem 1 CFFD-equivalence is a congruence with respect to the generalised parallel composition.
The proof of congruence when dealing with LTSs is presented in [11] . For LSTS there is no real difference, since the propositions have no effect on synchronisation and the values of propositions can be deduced from the traces.
On-the-fly verification with proposition rules
In addition to ordinary propositions, four different spe- 
µ evaluates to ÌÖÙ in × ½ , and the th component process does not participate in the cycle.
With ÁÒ Ö , the requirements are is otherwise the same as for ÄÐÖ , but the th component process must participate in the cycle. In this case the result of removing all invisible ( ) actions from
The conditions mean that whenever Ê is activated, some safety property has been violated, i.e., there is an illegal trace. Whenever ÐÖ is activated, we check if the system is in a deadlock. If the left-hand side of a condition on ÄÐÖ holds for a component process, then the rest of the system is checked for infinite behaviour in which the activating process does not participate. ÁÒ Ö is also activated by a single process, but it is used to check for infinite behaviour in which the activating process does participate infinitely often and which takes the component to such a state infinitely many times. This is essentially the same thing as acceptance by a Büchi automaton [5] . However, because of the way processes synchronise, only stuttering-insensitive properties can be checked in this way.
Algorithmically the detection of Ê and ÐÖ is quite straight-forward: Check for reachability of the state. If it is a Ê -state, error is detected. For ÐÖ one also has to check whether the state is a deadlock. Several relatively efficient methods exist for the detection of errors of the ÄÐÖ [5] and ÁÒ Ö [4] type.
If no errors are found in the parallel composition, then these conditions will have no effect whatsoever on the resulting LSTS. If an error is found, the construction of the parallel composition is aborted and the error is reported.
Example of on-the-fly verification
To explain the different rejection states and usage of state propositions in the construction of a whole system, we give a simple example, a demand-driven token-ring system for mutual exclusion. To illustrate how errors are detected on the fly, we introduce some -admittedly artificial -errors to the system.
The idea of the token ring is that one single token is passed clockwise (ØÖ for sending and ØÐ for receiving) and demands for the token are passed counterclockwise ( Ð and Ö for sending and receiving) among servers. Each server serves one client. If the client has requested access, the server grants this, provided it has the token. Once the client has been served, the server immediately passes the token on. This ensures that the other clients get a chance of being served before the present client is served again. The token is also passed on, if there is no request and a demand for the token has been received. Figure 3 shows the CFFD minimised LSTS model of a single server without errors. The state ½ represents the initial state of the server that originally has the token, and ¾ the initial state of the other servers that do not have the token initially. The states in which a server has the token are labelled with a permanent proposition Ì (for token). It is possible to check that the token never disappears by checking that the permanent proposition Ì remains true in the every global state of the system. With pure action-based methods, this check requires complicated bookkeeping of the movements of the token.
In Figure 1 , there is LSTS model of the simplified client. It repeatedly requests access or decides that it will not need the common resource anymore. Ö if ¾ ½ ¾ or " " otherwise.
¿ AE For releasing the rule " "
For each pair of adjacent servers in the closed ring, Ä Ä , where ´ ÑÓ Òµ · ½ two rules are needed:
ØÐ if ¾ ½, or ØÖ if ¾ ½, or " " otherwise, for passing the token, and
or " " otherwise, for transmitting the demands. We are mainly interested in how the system as a whole behaves from the point of view of a client in two aspects. First, that only one client has access at the same time, and second, that the client eventually gets access if it has requested it. In order to check these, the client is augmented with propositions ¥ Ï for marking states where the client is waiting access (Ï ), has access ( ), or is about to request access ( ).
Violations of the mutual exclusion property are detected by adding a proposition rule´´ ¾ µ ´ ¾ µ Ê µ for each pair Å Å of different clients. The required liveness property is checked with two proposition rules for each single client Å . The rule´´Ï ¾ µ ÄÐÖ µ ensures that the client does not starve, and the rule´´Ï ¾ µ ÐÖ µ ensures that the system does not halt while client has requested service.
This original model is correct, meaning that it does not activate any rejections. So, to demonstrate the detection of errors we add some. From the original system we device three different faulty ones by modifying some of the components. The added faults are shown in Figure 4 .
In the first experiment we add an invisible transition from state ¾ to ½ in one server. The faulty server may jump from ¾ to ½ without the environment being able to prevent it. If the client served by the faulty server now makes a request, the server acts as if it has the token and grants access to its client. At the same time, a correctly working server has the real token and it may be serving its client. This error was detected, as it activated one of the rules of the forḿ´ ¾ µ ´ ¾ µ Ê µ. In the second experiment we add a new state ½¾ and two transitions: ØÖ from ½¼ to ½¾ and Ð from ½¾ to in one of the servers. Suppose the client served by the faulty server has made a request and the server has the token. The client is in the state where Ï holds, the server in state ½¼. Now the server may pass the token on by executing "ØÖ ", if its rightmost neighbour is ready to receive it. Then the server makes a demand for the token Ð , and waits for the token to arrive. As the rest of the system is working correctly, the token will eventually arrive, and the server will return to state ½¼. This loop may be executed ad infinitum while the client waits in the very same state. The error is detected by the rule´´Ï ¾ µ ÄÐÖ µ.
In the third experiment we add a transition Ý from the state of a client where holds. The faulty client makes a request, which is eventually granted, as the rest of the system is working correctly. When in state , the client is able to execute Ý on its own. The server will never receive the release, so it will get stuck in state ½½. Suppose for example that all the other clients have made requests. None of their servers have the token, so they will eventually all end up waiting for it in state . The system now deadlocks, and one of the clients will have the rule´´Ï ¾ µ ÐÖ µ detect this error.
We did the examples on the TVT-tool using four servers and clients. TVT has been published in open source under NOKOS-licence and it its available for download at [1] .
